

The Issue of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority Group in the Dynamics of Bilateral and Regional Relations in South Asia

Dafa Evita Nurharianti

Universitas Komputer Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia

Sayidh Muhammad Rizky

Universitas Komputer Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia

Salsabila Andini Putri

Universitas Komputer Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia

Faran Akhtar

Universitas Komputer Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia

Sylvia Octa Putri

Universitas Komputer Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia

Andrias Darmayadi

Universitas Komputer Indonesia, Bandung, Indonesia

ABSTRACT

The problem of Rohingya ethnic minority is a humanitarian problem that affects bilateral and regional relations of South Asia. The Rohingya have faced discrimination and violence in Myanmar that has led to transnational movement of refugees especially to Bangladesh, which is the chief destination. This issue is no longer a domestic issue but it has become a regional issue that threatens the stability of the region and the tenets of regional cooperation. This paper will examine how the Rohingya problem has affected bilateral relations in South Asia, and how this affects regional cooperation. The research method used is a qualitative approach through a literature review of official documents, international organization reports, and academic studies. The results show that the Rohingya issue has triggered diplomatic tensions, challenged regional cooperation mechanisms, and exposed the limitations of regional institutions in addressing cross-border humanitarian crises.

Keywords: *Rohingya, Minority, Bilateral Relations, Regional Dynamics, South Asia, Humanitarian Crisis, Myanmar- Bangladesh*

INTRODUCTION

The Rohingya crisis has expanded its impact on the regional cooperation beyond the bilateral dynamics. South Asia does not have strong formal institutions as other parts of the world, however, countries reacting to the problem highlight challenges in creating coordinated actions to address The problem of the Rohingya ethnic minority has become a complicated, multidimensional humanitarian phenomenon in South Asia. This is a largely Muslim population, which began as residents of Myanmar in the Rakhine State, and is subjected to structural discrimination and lack of citizenship as well as systematic violence, resulting in statelessness and massive human rights violations (Alam, 2019, as cited in Islam & Wara, 2022). The Rohingya Muslim community is considered outsiders and marginalized (CFR, Springer Nature), and has been living centuries in northwestern Myanmar, particularly in Rakhine Province (formerly Arakan). Historical studies indicate that Muslim populations have lived in the region since the 15 th century Arakan Kingdom period when it was a trading and cultural center between South and Southeast Asia. The British colonial rule (1826-1948) in Arakan led to its incorporation into British India, which influenced the migration of labor into Arakan, including those who came to become the Rohingya. The situation deteriorated when Burma (Myanmar) achieved independence in 1948, and the dominance of the national identity based on Buddhism, coupled with the fact that the majority population started to marginalize the Rohingya even more, turning them into foreigners and outcasts (CFR, Springer Nature).

The 1982 Citizenship Law of Myanmar left the Rohingya off the list of 135 national ethnic groups recognized in that law. This made them stateless and denied basic rights such as freedom of movement, education and government services. The military regime took advantage of this inherent vulnerability to establish discrimination and control. Rohingya violence and military actions against the Rohingya have been ongoing since the 1970s. An example is Operation Dragon King (1977-1978) which forced more than 200,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh, with subsequent displacement episodes in 1990s security actions. The crisis peaked in 2017 when Myanmar's military initiated a massive "clearance operation" in Rakhine after attacks on security posts by the Rohingya militant group (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army). The brutal retaliation of the military was later termed by UN as ethnic cleansing, which drove over 700,000 Rohingya to cross the border into Bangladesh in less than one year.

Hundreds of thousands of Rohingya were forced to leave their homeland due to uncertain legal status and suffered violence, especially following the 2017 mass exodus that housed more than one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, which is now home to one of the largest refugee camps in the world, Cox's Bazar district. The consequences of the crisis are not just limited to Myanmar, as bilateral relations with neighbors are worsened. The Myanmar-Bangladesh relations in South Asia have been worsening due to the disagreements around the issue of refugee repatriation, border security, and the strain of resources caused by the massive migration (Banerjee, 2020). Such repatriation efforts since 2018 have failed repeatedly because of the anxieties of safety and citizenship among refugees, continuing to create instability in politics and social dynamics in both countries.

Being the closest neighbor, Bangladesh has borne the brunt of accommodating Rohingya refugees. As a result, Cox Bazar has become a mega-camp hosting more than one million individuals in a drastically overcrowded state with limited basic facilities in the whole world. Not only does this create humanitarian problems, but also presents social, economic, and security challenges to Bangladesh, which has difficulties balancing the aid obligations against the limited resources. The influx of refugees has also worsened Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral relations particularly in voluntary repatriation pacts, border cross-border humanitarian issues. Research demonstrates how South Asian countries such as Bangladesh and India differ in policy in handling Rohingya inflows and their impact on national security and international relations (Nastasia and Agussalim, 2022). On a grander scale, transregional actors like ASEAN countries even though they have a Southeast Asian hub influence political reactions through humanitarian diplomacy, refugee management, and aid coordination (Roy et al., 2025). The challenges

facing ASEAN such as non- interference and consensus principles reveal gaps in how the region is governed to deal with transnational crises (Inayah & Karisma, 2022).

Considering such complexity, this paper looks at how the Rohingya minority problem has affected bilateral relations between South Asia and what it means to the cooperation in the region. It highlights the cross-border of human migration, border security, and bilateral-regional diplomacy. Using a qualitative approach through literature reviews of official documents, international reports, and academic literature, the study will provide an in depth understanding of the Rohingya problem in South Asian regional politics and the barriers to finding solutions to cross- border, humanitarian dilemmas.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper will discuss the Rohingya ethnic minority problem that has escalated significantly within the last twenty years, especially in terms of human rights, ethnic conflict, and cross-national refugee migration. Majority of the literature agrees that Rohingya dilemma cannot be discussed out of the nation-state building of Myanmar which, according to its law, does not acknowledge this group as part of national identity. Preliminary research emphasizes that statelessness among Rohingya can be attributed to the exclusionary policies on citizenship, especially the 1982 Citizenship Law that negatively discriminated against them by blocking their participation in political and social systems (Leider, 2014; Southwick, 2015). The Rohingya have historically been present in Rakhine pre-colonially, and their presence was delegitimized in a post-independent Myanmar through the rise of the ethno-religious nationalism (Yegar, 2002; Ibrahim, 2016). These kinds of analyses demonstrate that the conflict is not about illegal migration (as the state asserts) but about identity clash based upon the power relationships between the state and minorities in which policies actively contribute to structural vulnerability of the Rohingya.

Previous studies have highlighted violence intensifications and military violence against the Rohingya between the 1970s and 2017 peak. The Rakhine security operations have been described in international reports and academic analyses as repressive with enormous humanitarian consequences that have resulted in mass flights to neighbors (Human Rights Watch, 2017; UNHCR, 2018). In this case, the literature views the Rohingya saga as a humanitarian emergency with spillover impacts created by the state. In international relations, attention is shifted towards the cost of the crisis to South Asian bilateral relations, particularly Myanmar-Bangladesh. Research emphasizes the fact that millions of Rohingya refugees socially, economically, and security-wise, transformed the foreign policy and diplomacy of Bangladesh with Myanmar (Banerjee, 2020; Ullah, 2021). This body of work illustrates the refugee issue's transformation of a modest bilateral link into one riddled with political friction and repatriation talks.

Besides bilateral aspects, studies address regional cooperation's constraints in addressing the crisis. Although the South Asian region has weak institutions, actions by regional and cross-regional participants such as ASEAN states are discussed as normative humanitarian diplomacy with no enforcement (Acharya, 2018; Inayah and Karisma, 2022). This highlights conflict between human rights demands and state sovereignty during transnational crises. The aggregate of research findings provides solid information on the causes of the Rohingya conflict, humanitarian implications, and bilateral-regional consequences. However, there is still a lack of literature that comprehensively addresses the Rohingya issue in the context of South Asian bilateral and regionalities. In this way, this paper fills that gap by placing the Rohingya minority in the center of understanding the changing political realities and international politics in South Asia.

METHODOLOGY

To answer the research question regarding the Rohingya ethnic minority issue in the dynamics of bilateral and regional relations in South Asia, the author used a qualitative research method. This method was chosen because it can provide insight into complex social and political phenomena, especially those related to international conflict, international cooperation, and cooperative work environments. A qualitative approach was used because the purpose of this study is to understand how inter-ethnic relations are influenced by historical factors, ethnic identity, national interests, and international norms. According to John W. Creswell in *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, the purpose of qualitative research is to investigate and understand the information provided to individuals or groups regarding a particular social issue. Data gathering in this study was done using academic literature study, where secondary data was used through scientific books, reputed journal articles, reports by international organizations, policy documents and credible online data. The use of secondary data is considered appropriate because the Rohingya issue has been widely studied by academics and international institutions, thus allowing the researcher to conduct a systematic comparative analysis and theoretical synthesis. Data analysis was conducted by grouping findings based on main themes, such as the dynamics of bilateral relations, regional responses, and the role of international norms and regional institutions, in order to obtain a comprehensive and in-depth picture of the problems studied.

DISCUSSION

The Construction of Identity and Citizenship Status of the Rohingya Ethnic Group in Myanmar

A. The history of the Rohingya presence in the Rakhine region, Arakan

Before the state of Myanmar was founded, Burma (Myanmar) was united by 3 dynasties. First by a pagan dynasty in 849 AD under the rule of the Burmese Tribe. Second, by the Taungu Dynasty under the Ava kingdom (1364-1555), and third by the Konbaung Dynasty (1752-1885). In 1287 AD, the Burmese Pagan Dynasty collapsed and split into small kingdoms until the Ava Kingdom emerged under the Burmese Tribe who had the ambition to unite the Burmese region. However, the Ava Kingdom did not succeed in reuniting the Burmese region, but the Taungu Kingdom succeeded in reuniting the territory of the Burmese Tribe Pagan Dynasty, to be precise in 1485, where the Ava Kingdom carried out an attack on the Arakan kingdom in Rakhine.

This attack made the Arakan king, Naramaikhla, flee to the country of Bengal (Bangladesh). At that time the Arakan Kingdom still adhered to a pure Theravada Buddhist style, the same as the Taungu Dynasty (Burma). In Bengal, King Naramaikhla established a friendship with the Sultan of Bengal. He also studied Islam and changed his name to Solaiman Shah. In 1428, King Naramaikhla decided to return to Arakan and reclaim the region with the help of troops from the Sultan of Bengal. This was successful, and Arakan was re-established under Solaiman Shah (Naramaikhla) in 1430 CE.

The re-establishment of the Arakan Kingdom in 1430 CE certainly brought reforms in various aspects and areas that were very different from the previous Arakan Kingdom. Externally, the Arakan Kingdom recognized that it was a vassal state of the Bengal Sultanate. Solaiman Shah then granted several territories to the Bengal Sultan, even including northern Arakan as part of Bengal (present-day Bangladesh). Internally, he also blended Buddhist and Islamic cultures, built mosques, reformed the judiciary, founded a city called Mrauk U, and granted titles to the kings who succeeded the Arakan Kingdom, even though they were Buddhist. Nevertheless, the Arakan Kingdom remained a Buddhist kingdom.

From the relationship between the Arakan Kingdom and the Bengali Sultanate, Muslims from Bengal to Arakan grew and became stronger, and these Muslims who came were later called "Rohingya". Furthermore, when the influence of the Bengali Sultanate became stronger and the territory of the Arakan Kingdom was not only in present-day Myanmar (Rakhine), but its northern region was in the Bengali region (current-day Bangladesh). That is why most Myanmar people prefer to call themselves "Bengalis" rather than "Rohingyas", plus the emphasis on the name is supported by the government.

In 1784 AD, the Burmese King from the Konbaung Dynasty attacked Arakan. This attack killed thousands of people and tens of thousands of people were taken prisoner by this dynasty. The fall of the Arakan Kingdom in 1785 AD to the Konbaung Dynasty was the beginning of friction between the Rohingya ethnic group and the indigenous tribes of Myanmar, especially the Burmese and Magh tribes in Rakhine, and this friction has continued until now.

B. Ethno-religious nationalism and the formation of state identity

The British colonial period in Myanmar has caused ethno-religious nationalism where the migration of the Bengal nation created a conflict with the indigenous Arakanese people and defined the discourse of a pure Buddhist identity since 1948. This was reinforced by the anti-Islamic rhetoric of the Ne Win government in the 1970s. During the 1980s, they changed Rohingya, who were included in the 1947 Constitution as an ethnic minority, into illegals (Taylor, 2018). Buddhist nationalists (35 969 Movement and monk Ashin Wirathu) popularized the campaign to mobilize the majority religious identity in Myanmar under the heading of Buddhists protect themselves against Islamization. The Muslim communities and especially Rohingya were represented in this story as a danger to the national identity and the Buddhist population. This rhetoric solidified a sense of marginality and social othering, and aligned with communal violence during the 2012 Rakhine unrest and the 2017 military operation, which many believe to have been ethnic cleansing. This phenomenon demonstrates that religious nationalism that results in the formation of threats and the heightening of conflict in plural societies is correlated.

The state identity building of Myanmar officially identifies 135 taingyintha, or national races, that arose as ethnic groups prior to the British colonialism in 1823. This temporal standard is applied to the validity of the membership in the national community politically. In practice, this categorization purposely omits the Rohingya off the official ethnic list. This affects their status as citizens, civil liberties, and their right to access to the law. Historical sources show that Muslim communities have lived and taken part in the social and political system of the Arakan region, now Rakhine State at least since the 15th century, especially in the Arakan Kingdom.

After the 1962 coup, the Rohingya issue was exploited by the Tatmadaw military to legitimize itself, as it considered them a state security threat (Selth, 2020). This identity construction had resulted in additional ethnic divisions. The Rohingya were not regarded as a formal ethnic group, and were compelled to identify as Bengali on their National Verification Card (NVC). This categorizing made them appear as Bangladeshi migrants, instead of the long-established Rakhine population. As a result, this position strengthened the state regimes of structural exclusion and inaccessibility to full citizenship, civil rights, and ethnic identity recognition (Farzana & Gibney, 2021). The policies and political attitudes of Myanmar are affected by ethno religious nationalism. The nation is not undergoing the pressure of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations Organization (UN), and it proclaims its sovereignty and safeguards the cultural identity of the majority in the country. In the meantime, the Rohingya residing in the refugee camps in Bangladesh retain their own identity by their language, religion, and customs, which enable them to retain their identity despite their statelessness.

Political exclusion and Citizenship Act 1982.

Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law is a legal instrument that initiated a humanitarian crisis and the

political exclusion of certain ethnic groups. The Myanmar citizenship in this law is determined by the highly conservative principle of *Ius Sanguinis* that is, citizenship by blood or ancestry.

Some of the mechanisms of this law have contributed to political exclusion of the Rohingya such as:

- The narrow legal definition of Myanmar. Article 3 of the law states that citizens are ethnic groups that settled in Burma before 1823 AD. This year was chosen because it was the period before British colonial rule, which effectively removed recognition of ethnic groups that arrived after 1823, including the Rohingya.
- Only 135 Recognized Ethnic Groups: The government only recognizes 135 national ethnic groups in Myanmar as indigenous or native. Article 4 even grants the State Council full authority to determine which ethnic groups are recognized without a clear and independent process.

This law creates a three-tiered citizenship system:

1. Full Citizenship: Only for ethnic groups listed in Article 3.
2. Associate Citizenship: For those who do not meet the requirements for full citizenship but apply under the 1948 law.
3. Naturalized Citizenship: For those who can prove residency before independence in 1948 and are fluent in the national language.

The requirement to prove residency before independence in 1948 is difficult for the majority of Rohingya. As a result, they are denied full citizenship and effectively become "foreigners" in their own homeland.

D. Production of statelessness status as state policy

The establishment of stateless Rohingya nationhood is a culmination of a progressive yet a systematic change in the Myanmar citizenship policy. Following independence, the Union Citizenship Act of 1948 still acknowledged the Rohingya as a citizenship deserving citizenry. This legal system was very accommodative since it adopted the principle of *jus soli* and the long established communities in the land. Hence, it was still possible to obtain citizenship documents and to engage in formal political life by the Rohingya at the time.

But this policy altered a great deal when the military took over the rule of the country under Ne Win. The state took an ethno-national approach with the Citizenship Law of 1982, according to which citizenship is based on the national race (*taingyintha*). Through this law the Rohingya were deprived of a legal claim to full citizenship since they were effectively excluded by being not included on the official ethnic list. Fully citizenship, associate citizenship and naturalized citizenship all come with different rights and protection. In practice the latter group has been grossly underaccessible because of tough administrative needs, which pose structural impediments to legalization. This legislation was retroactive and it could revoke citizenship of a large number of Rohingya. This policy led to the military operation in 1989 called Operation Nagamin, during which brutal residency checks were conducted, and mass document revocations took place. It was very powerful with about 250,000 Rohingya displaced to Bangladesh as a result of military pressure and violence associated with it. Since 2014, the policy of the National Verification Card (NVC) strengthens the stigmatization of Rohingya, as it makes them accept the status of Bengali, without acknowledging their ethnic belonging. This system is not merely administrative but also limits fundamental rights of property with a very low bar, marriages and travels. Also, Article 29 and 51 of 1982 Citizenship Law cause intergenerational discrimination, where children of the members of a nationality group stand a risk of inheriting incomplete or even stateless citizenry, which results in an indefinite cycle of citizenshiplessness.

Within a bilateral setting, statelessness is an obstacle to repatriation since Myanmar did not register until 2017. Instead, in 2019, the ICJ genocide case demanded transparency but did not introduce legal changes (Aziz, 2024). Such a situation reflects the disconnect between the domestic policy change and international normative pressure. Repatriation is likely to become an administrative fix with no promise of long-term safeguards as long as the definition of citizenship and ethnic awareness is not changed. Thus, the statuslessness of the Rohingya is not just a humanitarian or bilateral problem, but also a structural problem pertaining to the legal and political citizenship framework of Myanmar.

The Rohingya Refugee Crisis as a Cross-Border Impact

Rohingya refugee crisis is one blatant example of a transboundary impact that is complex. The persecution in a country, which is systematic, has resulted in humanitarian, security and socio-economic crisis that has shaken the whole region. The crisis that started due to discriminatory policy and violence in Myanmar, soon crossed territorial borders, affecting other countries, especially Bangladesh. This situation proves that the issue of internal conflict cannot be considered as a domestic issue but as a regional problem that needs to be addressed collectively solutions.

The beginning of this crisis had an impact on surrounding countries when a wave of mass displacement occurred, especially after military violence in August 2017. As a result of this incident, more than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. This massive displacement also became directly a liability that needed to be suffered by neighboring Bangladesh, but it did not end there. The ASEAN Countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, received hundreds of thousands of refugees. This situation increased the area of crisis and pulled more nations into the whirlwind of issues. The effects of this displacement on Bangladesh were on the Social and Economic arena, the entry of these refugees strained the Bangladeshi Economy, the cost of the basic needs doubled and the local labor wages reduced by nearly half as a result of the competition caused by informal labor. There were also social conflicts between the local people and the refugees which deteriorated the local security situation and brought new dimensions to the already poor and underdeveloped region.

This crisis has cross-border security issues in addition to the socio-economic effects. The lack of space and a lack of future opportunities provide the fertile soil to the transnational criminal networks like drug trafficking and human trafficking. Moreover, violence, killings, and extortion are being fuelled by armed groups like ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) in the camps endangering the lives of refugees, as well as the stability and security in the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.

The Rohingya Issue in the Dynamics of Myanmar-Bangladesh Bilateral Relations

A. Diplomatic Tensions and Repatriation Politics

Rohingya situation is a complex humanitarian and political issue in the relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh, which deals with the problems of human rights, national sovereignty, security, and the stability in general. The frozen repatriation efforts since 2018 have been the main subject of diplomatic tensions as they are mostly caused by the divergence in interests and perceptions of threats. The cause of the crisis may be linked to the citizenship laws of Myanmar, and, in particular to the law of 1982 that does not acknowledge the Rohingya and restricts their fundamental rights. The escalating violence, which began in 2012, and military operations of 2016-2017 led to a significant number of refugees entering Bangladesh. Though Bangladesh has been humanitarily accommodative to receive these refugees initially, it finds itself at cross-roads in Cox's Bazar and the government is thus considering repatriation as the primary solution to this problem by use of diplomatic negotiations.

The agreement signed between the two countries in November 2017 marked a significant step towards repatriation. Under this agreement, both countries agreed to begin a phased repatriation of

refugees, with an identity verification system as a key requirement. However, this agreement has not yet been effectively implemented.

The 2018 repatriation plan failed due to a lack of security guarantees and citizenship from Myanmar. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh refused to return without protection of their basic rights. Differing interpretations of "voluntary repatriation" and political mistrust exacerbated the deadlock. Myanmar also demanded security verification, while Bangladesh feared that forced repatriation would trigger instability. Until 2022–2025, relations between the two countries remained tense; at that time, Bangladesh threatened to unilaterally repatriate the refugees, but this was rejected by Myanmar. (Hossain, 2021).

Myanmar requires security checks on refugees to help curb possible infiltration by militants and Bangladesh fears that the process might slow or hinder the process of repatriation. This lack of trust has intensified after the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021. Myanmar has changed its foreign policy under the State Administration Council, where the military focuses on controlling the country and gaining legitimacy. The re-transfer of the Rohingya is, therefore, not perceived as a serious concern, but as a secondary one.

Research indicates that repatriation policies reflect the domestic priorities of both countries: Myanmar is focused on consolidating military power post-coup, while Bangladesh is under economic pressure due to the presence of 1.2 million refugees in Cox's Bazar. Efforts like the Rakhine Verification Mission have been unsuccessful because of disagreement on the lists of refugees, which have further worsened diplomatic ties (Islam and Rana, 2020). In this light, the Bangladeshi government has stepped up the diplomatic pressure on Myanmar, and even threatened to engage in unilateral repatriation between 2022 and 2025, something that Myanmar strongly opposes as a breach of the principles of the bilateral agreement and international law.

The failure of the measures such as refugee verification demonstrates the administrative and political barriers to repatriation, especially due to the mismatch of data and documents, which emphasizes the power imbalance when Myanmar is in charge of verifying refugees. Realism helps to understand the stalemate in the context of national interests of each nation, whereas constructivism underlines the sole identity of Myanmar who denies the Rohingya. This standoff has an impact on the stability of the region such as the increased cases of human trafficking and the danger of a lost generation. "

A resolution would require a holistic solution that encompasses citizenship guarantees, protection and development in Rakhine. Reforms in Myanmar policies and long-term international assistance to Bangladesh will be necessary to enable successful repatriation.

B. Border Security Issues and Bilateral Trust

The Rohingya conflict between Myanmar and Bangladesh has been transformed into a multifaceted border security problem as opposed to being a humanitarian crisis. The previously free and relatively open border, which was enjoyed in the past, has been turned into a highly regulated and tense one, which is reflective of how humanitarian crises are changing the security relationships between the neighbouring countries. Security of the borders has become a key source of tension with Bangladesh adopting more stringent policies towards preventing additional refugee influx.

These are the measures of the greater military presence, the greater surveillance along the coast and rivers, the stricter measures against informal crossings. The reasons behind such policies lie in the economic and social strains caused by the presence of more than one million Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, which makes Bangladesh see this problem as more of a national security challenge.

On the other hand, the increased border control also has to do with the fears of cross-border crime, such as human trafficking and drug transportation, especially in such regions as the Naf River, where geographical factors contribute to the unlawful flow. Bangladesh believes that surveillance is a required

measure to ensure the country is stable internally and to prevent future penetration by militant groups. Myanmar on the other hand sees these activities by Bangladesh as being overboard and could be damaging to their bilateral relations. Although Myanmar defends its military actions in Rakhine State by claiming it is aimed at maintaining internal security as well as fighting armed groups, Bangladesh tends to suspect that it is also targeting its internal security, which further increases the lack of trust between the two states.

The situation has become more tense because of the allegations the military of Myanmar is operating near or even inside the border. Since 2019 and 2023, there have been many instances of shooting along the Naf River. Bangladesh border policy has shifted towards one of openness to security, as it tries to balance the humanitarian concerns and the threat presented by terrorist groups, which are found in the refugee camps. There is little trust between the two countries, and Myanmar accuses Bangladesh of protecting ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) fighters, whereas Dhaka accuses the military junta of forced migration (Rahman, 2022). These small incidents, however, do point out to the lack of trust between the security services of the two countries and also show how easily border areas can be exposed to escalating violence. The security dilemma concept of international relations can be used to analyze this situation. By one country improving its defense in the name of protection, the other country may perceive that as a threat and work hard to strengthen its defenses. The confrontational stances of both parties in the case of Myanmar and Bangladesh contribute to the cycle of mistrust and reduce opportunities to cooperate.

This distrust between Myanmar and Bangladesh also creates a problem with security coordination because the different perceptions of threats and national interests of the countries prevent effective cooperation, even though the officials of the countries communication occurs regularly. Myanmar focuses more on the internal stability, whereas Bangladesh is more concerned about the defense of sovereignty and management of consequences of the Rohingya crisis. In the meantime, the intensifying violence in Rakhine State has increased the instability in the region, causing Bangladesh to fear the possibility of another wave of refugees and strengthening border security measures that have been in place since 2017.

C. The Role of International Actors in Bilateral Relations

The Rohingya problem has transformed into an international crisis involving legal, political and humanitarian aspects and the international actors have a role in the Myanmar- Bangladesh diplomacy and policy. The United Nations, especially UNHCR is also involved in the humanitarian aid and repatriation process, that is, they are working in collaboration with Bangladesh and lobbying to safe conditions in Myanmar. Nonetheless, its success is limited by the ideals of sovereignty and the denial of outside interference by Myanmar. The disagreement on security guarantees and citizenship issues hinders the repatriation process. The unwillingness of Myanmar to provide full recognition and restriction of the international monitoring are indicative of unwillingness to deal with discrimination, which results in the long-standing stalemate.

In addition to its humanitarian role, international law serves as a vital platform for global actors to engage. Since 2019, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been addressing the genocide lawsuit filed by Gambia against Myanmar, which has compelled Naypyidaw to engage in indirect negotiations with Dhaka (Aziz and Karim, 2021). This lawsuit is based on the principle of obligations erga omnes partes, permitting states involved in the convention to bring claims regarding violations, even if they are not directly affected. The ICJ legal process has allowed the Rohingya crisis to assume a new aspect as Myanmar was subject to the scrutiny of international law and subjected the government to moral and diplomatic pressures. In 2020, the ICJ provisional decision to compel Myanmar to end the acts of genocide and report on efforts made has strengthened the normative position held by the international

community on the matter.

The involvement of the ICJ has influenced the relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh by strengthening the diplomatic status of Bangladesh in the international arena, whereas Myanmar sees it as a form of outside pressure that has made it tough. The Rohingya problem has therefore grown to be more not only a bilateral issue, but also a question of international law. At the international level, the decisions of the United Nations resolutions and the Human Rights Council are not binding but put a political and reputational pressure on Myanmar and impact its foreign policy. This highlights the importance of international organizations in norms development and the collective pressure.

In addition to international organizations and courts, these actors exert bilateral influence by pressuring Myanmar through UN resolutions, while Bangladesh receives assistance from the United States and the European Union. However, ASEAN's fragmentation following the coup in 2021 has diminished its regional influence (Nahar, 2024). Bangladesh has received the much-needed financial and logistical support to help them cope with refugees camps even in areas like health, education, and food security. This will help to reduce the fiscal burden of Bangladesh and increase its ability to keep domestic stability. In terms of international political economy, this assistance may also be seen as a burden-sharing to cope with a massive humanitarian crisis.

The role of this actor influences bilateral relations by applying pressure on Myanmar through United Nations resolutions, while Bangladesh receives assistance from the United States and the European Union. However, the fragmentation of ASEAN following the 2021 coup has diminished its regional influence (Nahar, 2024). Meanwhile, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on Myanmar residents and military organizations that are considered to be responsible to committing human rights abuses. These sanctions are a coercive diplomacy in terms of economic and political pressure aimed to obtain behavior change. Nonetheless, the success of these steps is controversial, because Myanmar can find allies among other stakeholders in the region. However, the impact of the Western countries is still felt in the perception and image of Myanmar in the global arena.

The intervention of world actors in the Rohingya crisis has both advantages and disadvantages on the negotiations between Myanmar and Bangladesh, since it empowers the latter with better bargaining power, but at the same time, it limits the negotiation options, as Myanmar views it as foreign influence. The implication of this involvement is the conflicting nature of the doctrine of state sovereignty and the duty to protect, which form an intricate political and legal relationship. Overall, the pressure and encouragement towards finding a solution to the crisis are increased by the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, and donor nations like the United States and the European Union. This makes Rohingya a concern worldwide. It is based on bilateral cooperation with the positive involvement of international actors without infringement of the sovereignty of any country.

The absence of trust between Myanmar and Bangladesh disrupts the coordination of security because the perception of threats and national interests cannot be effectively coordinated because of the differences in perceptions of threats and domestic priorities. Myanmar focuses on preserving internal stability whereas Bangladesh focuses on safeguarding sovereignty and dealing with the consequences of the Rohingya crisis. Meanwhile, the increasing conflict in Rakhine State has led to increased instability in the region and is of concern. Bangladesh about the potential for a new wave of refugees and reinforcing stricter border security policies implemented since 2017.

D. Structural Barriers in Conflict Resolution

The difficult circumstances faced by the Rohingya people in Myanmar and Bangladesh are fraught with structural issues that make it difficult to address any of them. Similarly, the 1982 citizenship statute basically states that the Rohingya are not among the national races, thus they are treated as illegal

immigrants. It means that there are no rights to move, attend school, work and even vote. This arrangement is a colossal block to get them safely home, since they cannot do anything without papers, they are merely stranded.

Myanmar seems to be shaping its identity based on some ethnic groups and anyone not fitting into them is forced to the periphery. Citizenship is not merely the law but also the acceptance in the society and politics. Unless they go back with that, it might only create more statelessness, where people are in their own country but have no protection. The entire crisis lingers in Myanmar due to these inherent restrictions as long as that old law remains without any significant modifications. The military, or Tatmadaw, has such influence in politics there, that it dominates security matters and even parliamentary seats prior to the coup in 2021. This causes all the Rohingya-related matters to be more of maintaining things safe than rights and people to fit in. This was all about gaining control of the area, which those operations in Rakhine in 2016 and 2017 had forced a ton of them into Bangladesh. Outside aid organizations find it hard to enter due to security concerns and this is detrimental to the people who remain in Rakhine even the Rohingya who remained. It is reported that help is blocked by the military and then in the Bangladesh camps, it is aggravated by corruption, such as aid stolen or data faked and resources misappropriated. When such emergencies are long, the chances of corruption increase, and it disrupts the lives of refugees, as well as causes the decline of international trust. This is a sign of institutional weakness and a lack of oversight, as well as aid that is not distributed evenly and instead creates even greater tension in the refugee camps. In the long run, Bangladesh becomes a weaker party in the negotiation, as Myanmar can use the mess as a pretext to postpone the return of people.

Myanmar is also divided a lot internally by ethnic and religious material, and the military employs Buddhist nationalism to remain in power (Uddin, 2020). These barriers require constitutional amendments, which are not forthcoming (Khan, 2022). Top of that, there is this profound trauma and lack of trust of the Myanmar government by the Rohingya. Returning to the country without any actual reforms to secure the minorities may be just a piece of paper, rather than a healing process. The cards are held by Myanmar in terms of citizenship and land, and all the humanitarian burden is carried by Bangladesh, which means that talks are one-sided, and everything would depend on the Myanmar changing its domestic policies. This is structural violence, the system itself is the source of injustices, no citizenship, obstructing aid and corruption. All of it is linked to legal, political, institutional and social components. Unless laws are reformed, it becomes more open and leadership truly committed, it remains minimal to fix the conflict. It must not be diplomacy alone, but must strike at the roots of things, where a few of these become a little confused to resolved.

The Rohingya Issue as a Non-Traditional Security Challenge in South Asia

Non-traditional threats are threats that arise from non-state actors and can include various activities such as terrorism, robbery, piracy, smuggling, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and theft of state resources (Masys, 2022). A region with unique features to study is South Asia because of the numerous differences in socio-economic, security, and political realities in this region, the threat to the South Asian region is the high number of refugees who keep coming in countries in the South Asian region, Rohingya is one of the variations of issues that have arisen in the South Asian region. In Bangladesh per se, as of January 31, 2026, UNHCR recorded 1,182,755 refugees in this nation.

The Rohingya issue has become a serious issue that threatens stability in South Asia, as its impacts encompass humanitarian, socio-economic, security, and inter-state political aspects. Following the mass exodus out of Myanmar, over one million Rohingya refugees have been residing in overcrowded camps in Bangladesh, with the demand of basic aid and minimal financing resulting in decreased food distribution and decreasing health care provision to refugees and local population. These circumstances only

heighten the likelihood of social conflict and the security situation since reliance on external aid and strain on local resources may contribute to discontent, raise crime rates, and destabilize social order in the impacted regions.

The UN and humanitarian organizations have indicated that the long-running Rohingya crisis is causing transnational problems, such as emergency migration by sea to other nations in South and Southeast Asia, and political instability in Myanmar that complicates the process of refugees being returned to their homeland, which may destabilize the region unless the international community and regional institutions respond to the problem in a holistic way.

The processes that resulted in the deteriorated state of the Rohingya people included different forces, which culminated to the Rohingya people becoming refugees. Although none of these individuals is solely responsible for this crisis, all these factors have led to years of agony by the Rohingya. This dimension should not be disregarded because latent interests play a role in the nature of the crisis and migration of refugees. The crisis has been influenced by ethnic and religious backgrounds of the Rohingya, regional and global geopolitics, the international community and interests of big powers like India and China all of which directly affect Bangladesh.

On the surface, this war seems to be an ethnic and religious war which is shaped by the political vision of the Myanmar government. This is however, the veil of power that is usually clouded by the international media reporting which tends to be more humanitarian in nature and the security of the refugees without going deeper into the issue and the underlying causes of the problem. Actually, geopolitical rivalry between Myanmar and the major powers in the region had a long history and a complex character, and Bangladesh frequently was its center, as its national ambitions and steady economic development grew. More so, geostrategic considerations like trade routes, national security, gas pipeline routes and other strategic considerations also dominate the dynamics of the crisis.

Limitations of South Asian Regional Cooperation

The limitations of regional cooperation in South Asia in addressing the Rohingya minority issue demonstrate weaknesses in the region's institutional and normative capacity to address humanitarian issues that impact regional stability. The Rohingya minority issue, rooted in discrimination, violence, and denial of citizenship in their country of origin, has now become a regional issue due to the large influx of refugees to South Asian countries such as Bangladesh and India. However, responses to the Rohingya minority issue in South Asia have been based more on national or bilateral responses than on a collective regional response. This demonstrates weaknesses in regional cooperation in addressing the issue in the context of minority protection (Nandy, 2025; Howlader, 2023).

From an institutional perspective, the role of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), as the main regional organization in South Asia, is considered ineffective in addressing the Rohingya issue. In fact, since its inception, SAARC's primary focus has been on regional cooperation in economic, development, and other non-political technical issues. However, human security issues such as human rights and refugee issues have never been a priority on the agenda of regional organizations like SAARC. This is due to the lack of regional legislation on refugee issues; therefore, SAARC is considered incapable of addressing the Rohingya issue due to its institutional weaknesses in addressing regional issues. This is primarily due to the stagnation of regional organizations like SAARC due to bilateral issues between countries in the region, especially between India and Pakistan (Dash, 2019).

In the context of the Rohingya crisis, SAARC's limitations are evident in the absence of concrete initiatives at the regional level to support the search for a comprehensive solution, either through joint diplomacy with Myanmar or through the establishment of burden-sharing mechanisms among refugee-hosting countries. Instead, the Rohingya crisis is more often discussed in the context of relations between Myanmar and Bangladesh, with limited involvement from other South Asian countries. This strategy does not only overlook the regional aspect of the crisis, but it also keeps the regional policies

divided. The actions towards Rohingya refugees have thus been uneven, sporadic and very much affected by the interest of individual states. (Milton et al., 2017).

The second reason why the regional cooperation in South Asia is not effective in terms of solving the Rohingya crisis is that the principles of the state sovereignty and non-intervention are rather strong. The South Asian nations have been hesitant to call on the Myanmar government publicly over the issue of violating human rights of the Rohingya ethnic minority due to the fear that they would be leading a precedent of meddling in the internal affairs of the country. Although this principle is relevant in promoting stability in interstate relations, it has been a barrier to the solution of a systemic humanitarian crisis that does not respect national borders. That is, the excessive emphasis on the principle of state sovereignty has undermined the efforts to protect human rights. (Letchamanan, 2013).

Moreover, the shortcomings of regional cooperation in South Asia are also reflected in the inability to normatively commit to the international system of protection of refugees. The South Asian region has seen most of its countries not ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol in 1967, hence they are not bound under international law with respect to the granting of asylum, non-refoulement and adherence to basic rights of the refugees. This absence of a legal framework is directly reflective on the legal status of the Rohingya in South Asian nations where they are viewed as illegal immigrants or security concerns as opposed to a population in need of international protection. This legal framework also contributes to securitization of Rohingya refugees and eventually makes them more vulnerable in the countries they live in. (Uddin, 2020).

In the dynamics of bilateral or regional relations, the Rohingya crisis is often politicized as a tool for national interests. For Bangladesh, the economic pressure caused by millions of Rohingya refugees is enormous, not only for the economy but also for the environment and social stability in the country. Therefore, the government demands the repatriation of the Rohingya as soon as possible without guarantees of their security and citizenship rights in Myanmar. For other countries in South Asia, the response to the Rohingya crisis has been relatively passive or pragmatic, aiming to maintain stability in the country and relations with Myanmar. Therefore, disagreements over national interests also influence the formation of regional responses to the Rohingya crisis (Nandy, 2025).

Furthermore, the inability of regional security cooperation to address the Rohingya crisis has significant consequences for regional security stability in South Asia. Refugee management has the potential to create social problems, horizontal conflict, and even the emergence of social rebellion and transnational criminal activity. Regional security cooperation in South Asia has failed to integrate a human security approach into regional security management. The focus on state security has led to the management of refugees and minorities being viewed as a burden rather than a regional responsibility (Acharya, 2014). The limitations of regional cooperation in South Asia are also reflected in the absence of a normative commitment to an international refugee protection system. Most countries in the South Asian region have not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Therefore, they have no international legal obligations regarding the provision of international protection to refugees and the

fulfillment of their basic rights. This absence of an international legal framework has a direct impact on the legal status of Rohingya refugees in South Asian countries, who are considered illegal immigrants and security threats rather than refugees in need of international protection. These policies are responsible for the securitization of Rohingya refugees, further increasing their vulnerability in South Asian countries (Uddin, 2020).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion

The whole issue of the Rohingyas can be attributed to the approach that is adopted by Myanmar in

dealing with the issue of citizenship. For instance, under the 1982 Citizenship Law, such groups of people as the Rohingyas are excluded because they do not belong to any national ethnic groups, as defined by the government. The effect of such an approach is that statelessness is created. However, it goes beyond mere administration. In fact, this makes them lose their basic rights, involvement in civil activities, and participation in politics and society.

The refugees began arriving in Bangladesh in 2017 in large numbers, and today, it has become a massive burden for them, be it financially, from the point of security, or even environmentally due to all these camps. The discussions for repatriation between the two states have been consistently delayed due to the fact that both Myanmar and Bangladesh might have their own goals, do not have mutual trust, and have a power disparity during negotiations. With the fundamental issues of citizenship and security in Myanmar not sorted out, repatriation seems meaningless.

This matter has escalated into an international security problem that transcends any form of border clash or related issues in South Asia. Agencies like the UN Refugee Agency have gotten involved, with the issue reaching the level of being filed in the International Court of Justice, showing how international this problem actually is. Despite external pressure, Myanmar has yet to take action by amending their laws or policies. Cooperation in South Asia has shown to be ineffective, particularly in the form of regional cooperation in SAARC, suggesting there is a more fundamental issue when it comes to handling humanitarian problems that involve all parties in South Asia. Dealing with the Rohingya crisis seems to have become chaotic and fragmented, relying primarily on the needs of each country individually.

Recommendations

To address this issue in the long term, there needs to be radical reform of the current system prevailing in Myanmar. Some possible suggestions include the amendment of the 1982 Citizenship Law to accommodate more individuals while aligning with international human rights principles. In my opinion, the recognition of the Rohingya identity and full citizenship rights for this community is essential, considering the safety and voluntary return of refugees in order to preserve their dignity.

With no legal reforms and institutions, attempts to return individuals to their homes will merely end up recreating the same issues, including discrimination and perpetual violence. This trend appears set to continue forever unless there is some alteration.

As far as the regional level is concerned, the South Asian nations ought to cooperate to a much larger extent, even consider developing joint structures for providing protection to the refugees and distributing the responsibilities among themselves instead of tackling it on a state-to-state basis. That alone will not do the job; at least, that is how I see it. In terms of international assistance, the efforts have to go beyond providing short-term emergency relief to investing in the development of the most affected regions and managing the refugee camps in a manner that provides greater transparency.

REFERENCES

- Hu, C.-P., & Chang, Y.-Y. (2017). *Review of Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. *Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences*, 4(2).
https://www.ucg.ac.me/skladiste/blog_609332/objava_105202/fajlovi/Creswell.pdf
- aved, H. (2023). *Non-traditional security challenges to refugee management in Bangladesh*. *Regional Studies*, 65-69.
<https://regionalstudies.com.pk/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/4.-NON-TRADITIONAL-SECURITY-CHALLENGES.pdf>
- Hossain, A. N. M. Z. (2022). *Geopolitics of Rohingya refugee crisis and regional security*. *International*

- Journal of Safety and Security Engineering*, 12(2), 171–172.
<https://doi.org/10.18280/ijssse.120204>
- Hossain, M. (2021). *Diplomatic tensions in Rohingya repatriation: Myanmar-Bangladesh dynamics*. *Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs*, 8(2), 145–167.
<https://journals.sagepub.com/loi/AIA>
- Islam, M., & Rana, S. (2020). *Border security challenges in Rohingya crisis*. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 28(3), 210–230. <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raps20>
- Rahman, A. (2022). *Trust deficit in Myanmar-Bangladesh relations*. *Southeast Asian Studies*, 15(1), 89–110. <https://englishkyoto-seas.org/>
- Aziz, K., & Karim, M. (2021). *ICJ's role in Rohingya genocide case*. *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 33(4), 456–478. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeab012>
- Nahar, L. (2024). *UNHCR facilitation failures*. *Global Governance*, 30(3), 401–423. <https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-03003005>
- Uddin, N. (2020). *Ethnic identity and citizenship denial*. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46(5), 1023–1040. <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20>
- Khan, R. (2022). *Domestic politics hindering resolution*. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 44(1), 56–78. <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs44-1c>
- Taylor, R. H. (2018). *Constitutional evolution*. *Pacific Review*, 31(5), 678–697. <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpre20>
- Farzana, K. F., & Gibney, M. (2021). *Rohingya identity construction*. *Citizenship Studies*, 25(4), 456–472.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccst20>
<https://academic.oup.com/ijrl>
- Dash, K. C. (2019). *Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating cooperation, institutional structures*. Routledge.
- Howlader, M. R. (2023). *The Rohingya refugee crisis and regional security implications in South Asia*. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 36(2), 345–362.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feac078>
- Letchamanan, G. (2013). *Myanmar's Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh: Still a humanitarian crisis*. *Journal of International Affairs*, 66(2), 87–102.
- Milton, A. H., Rahman, M., Hussain, S., Jindal, C., Choudhury, S., Akter, S., Ferdousi, S., Mouly, T. A., Hall, J., & Efirid, J. T. (2017). *Trapped in statelessness: Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh*. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 14(8), 942. <https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14080942>
- Nandy, D. (2025). *The Rohingya refugee crisis: Implications for peace and security in South Asia*. In S. Roy et al. (Eds.), *Decoding the chessboard of Asian geopolitics: Asian powerplay in South Asia* (pp. 261–284). Springer.
- Sesariato, K. A. (2021). *Whose governance, which legitimacy? Myanmar's collective agency in a domineering framework on the Rohingya crisis*. *Intermestic: Journal of International Studies*, 5(2), 277–296.
- Sigit, R. N., & Novianti, N. (2021). *Perlindungan terhadap orang tanpa kewarganegaraan (stateless people) dalam hukum internasional (studi kasus etnis Rohingya di Myanmar)*. *Uti Possidetis: Journal of International Law*, 1(1), 118–147. <https://doi.org/10.22437/up.v1i1.8303>
- Sugiyono. (2016). *Metode penelitian kuantitatif, kualitatif, dan R&D*. Penerbit Alfabeta.
- Zahed, I. U. M. (2021). *The state against the Rohingya: Root causes of the expulsion of Rohingya from Myanmar*.
- Zarni, M., & Cowley, A. (2014). *The slow-burning genocide of Myanmar's Rohingya*. *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal*, 23, 683–754.
- Mokhtar, K. A. (2019). *Protection of human rights in Southeast Asia with special reference to the Rohingya in Myanmar: A critical study of the effect of ASEAN's policy and action on ASEAN*

Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). *Padjadjaran Journal of International Law*, 3(2). <http://jurnal.fh.unpad.ac.id/index.php/pjil/article/view/315>
Norwegian Refugee Council. (2026, January 21). *Bangladesh: Rohingya families lose everything in devastating fire amid funding crisis*. Norwegian Refugee Council. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2026/bangladesh-rohingya-families-lose-everything-in-devastating-fire-amid-funding-crisis>
Politics, Religion & Ideology, 22(3–4), 436–460. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2021.1995716>

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dafa Evita Nurharianti, Email : dafa.44322030@mahasiswa.unikom.ac.id

Dafa Evita Nurharianti is a student in the International Relations Study Program at Universitas Komputer Indonesia.

She is student who are ambitious and dedicate in pursuing their higher education, always interested in learning about global issues and exploring new things.

Sayidh Muhammad Rizky, Email : sayidh.44322079@mahasiswa.unikom.ac.id

Sayidh Muhammad Rizky is a student in the International Relations Study Program at Universitas Komputer Indonesia. He is student who are ambitious and dedicate in pursuing their higher education, always interested in learning about global issues and exploring new things.

Salsabila Andini Putri, Email : salsabila.44322016@mahasiswa.unikom.ac.id

Salsabila Andini Putri is a student in the International Relations Study Program at Universitas Komputer Indonesia. She is student who are ambitious and dedicate in pursuing their higher education, always interested in learning about global issues and exploring new things.

Faran Akhtar, Email : faran.44322036@mahasiswa.unikom.ac.id

Faran Akhtar is a student in the International Relations Study Program at Universitas Komputer Indonesia. He is student who are ambitious and dedicate in pursuing their higher education, always interested in learning about global issues and exploring new things.

Sylvia Octa Putri, Email : sylvia.octa.putri@email.unikom.ac.id

Sylvia Octa Putri , Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Komputer Indonesia's (UNIKOM). Holds master's degree in international relations from Universitas Padjadjaran (UNPAD) and bachelor from Universitas Komputer Indonesia. Currently serving in two roles that demonstrate a commitment to academic, as the Editor-in-Chief of Global Political Studies Journal (GPSJ) and as the Coordinator of Quality Assurance for the Department of International Relations. Research expertise is centered on contemporary global political economy, with a publication record in international journals and conference proceedings on topics including economic diplomacy, digital economy, paradiplomacy, and East Asia Studies.

Andrias Darmayadi, Ph D, email: andrias.darmayadi@email.unikom.ac.id

Andrias Darmayadi, Ph D, senior lecturer at IR Universitas Komputer Indonesia since 2002. He Finish his Ph.D in the field of IR, Dr Andrias actively conduct research and writes scientific paper with a focus on International Politics, ASEAN Studies and Cyber Diplomacy.